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Abstract: 
The present paper is an attempt to analyze the impact of recent global slow down on the 
restructuring of the global economy. It tries to provide empirical basis for the same through 
examining important international macroeconomic variables like FDI Inflows, FDI Outflows, FDI Net 
flows etc. Regression, Correlation and Granger Causality tests have been employed for recognizing 
trends and relationships. The results indicate that the developing region of the world is improving 
their economic status in international arena in terms of GDP growth rates, FDI inflows and outflows. 
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The present Global Financial Crisis (GFC) started to appear in mid-2007. When the US 
economy witnessed a decline in real GDP for more than four months everyone suspected an ensuing 
slowdown. Officially the bubble got burst with the failure of Lehman Brothers, the leading financial 
institution in United States of America. Though economic fluctuations follow different trends, the 
present recession is regarded as a black swan because of it being a low probability event, an outlier, 
outside realm of reasonable expectations and carrying an extreme impact. We already know since the 
experience of Great Depression of 1930s how drastic the effects of such a crisis can be. One of the 
major impacts of the recent slowdown has been the restructuring of the global economy in different 
aspects. 
Objectives set for the present paper are: 
1. To highlight the causes and consequences of the present GFC with a special focus on 
restructuring of global economy. 
2. To focus and empirically analyse gradual shifts in global economy in terms of FDI Inflows 
and Outflows. 
Methodology  
The paper has employed both descriptive and analytical approach. Towards first objective it 
overviews existing literature and summarizes the main findings, focusing particularly on some topics 
which deemed important. For empirical analysis Regression, Correlation and Granger Causality tests 
have been employed identifying significant trends and relationships. 
Coming to the causes of the present GFC, the most important one has been the collapse of US 
Sub-Prime mortgage market because of reversal of the housing boom. Shorters1 were the ones blamed 
for forcing down the market value of Banking Group HBOS. The underlying factor for both of these 
has been weak regulation of financial sector. Joseph Stiglitz points that American financial system 
failed in its two crucial responsibilities of managing risk and allocating capital. In other words 
financial crisis emerged from an over-supply of financial innovation and an under-supply of financial 
regulation within the core advanced economies2. Other causes have been soaring commodity prices, 
increasingly restrictive monetary policies in a number of countries, and stock market volatility3. 
Today’s world being more of a global village with greater integration, the effects of crisis in 
one big country gets rippled and most of the countries are affected in one way or other. The most 
important consequences have been 
• Collapse of world’s largest financial institutions resulting in the fall of stock markets  
• The credit crisis and high cost of borrowing led to many a job cuts across different 
countries and sectors. 
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• Fall in consumption levels which in Keynesian terms is dearth of aggregate effective 
demand affected the whole economy. 
If these were the immediate effects in the developed countries the developing countries are 
facing a different set of problems altogether.  
• Soaring food prices, fuel prices and prices of other commodities. This drastically affects 
those developing countries which depend on goods for their import and export. 
• Because of Uncertainty and instability in international financial currency and 
commodity markets coupled with doubts about the monetary policy to be pursued by 
developed nations, many developing nations became uncertain about the policy they 
themselves have to pursue. 
• With fewer funds available for development, the GFC has become a crisis of poverty for 
humanity. The social protection commitments have received a setback4. 
• There has been evidence of negative or slow growth rates and negative effects on 
important sectors like agriculture, manufacturing5, energy6, insurance7etc. 
The magnitude of the effects of GFC or recession calls for the coping strategies both at macro 
and micro levels. At macro level it is global and national strategies and at micro it is strategies 
followed by individual enterprises.  One of the themes of this seminar being managing recession in 
global context I limit to macro strategies. The immediate strategy thought out in countries drastically 
affected by GFC was bail-out and rescue packages*. The Keynesian thought which had been left out 
in way back 1970s again entered the minds of policy makers as a remedy to the present GFC. Apart 
from bail-outs other remedial measures considered by nations were 
• To stop market manipulations like shorting. 
• Nationalization of Banks in some European countries. 
• The most important one has been to stimulate economy through reduced interest rates, 
reduce taxes, support borrowing activities, increased spending on public works etc 
which is based on Keynesian ideas.  
The strategies thought of at global level include: 
• Restructuring and strict supervision of International Financial System including 
reforming of Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs). “One size fits all” attitude of these 
institutions should be done away with.  
As john Vandaele Journalist puts it - The most powerful international institutions tend to have 
the worst democratic credentials: the power distribution among countries is more unequal, and the 
transparency, and hence democratic control, is worse. 
• Increasing capital and liquidity requirements at financial institutions. 
• The introduction of a country bankruptcy code that will enable orderly sovereign debt 
restructuring.  
• Not just expanding the capital adequacy requirement, but also making it counter-
cyclical, rather than pro-cyclical as it currently is (i.e. making credit a bit harder to get 
during good times).  
• Stricter regulations of tax havens and private equity funds, which have greatly 
contributed to increasing opacity in the financial market.  
• Credit rating agencies play a critical role in today’s financial system and given the 
damages they have inflicted by blessing all those toxic assets, these agencies need to be 
much more heavily regulated or even replaced by an international public body8.  
• Crackdown on international tax havens to address harmful tax competition between 
states9. So that some tax revenue is generated within states. 
• Better representation of developing countries at international financial institutions.  
Like G20 instead of G8*. (But 3% of votes will not do). 
 Infact Joseph Stiglitz talks about BW II which works both in emerging and capitalist 
economies. China has been voicing concerns over having alternative to US dollar at international 
level. All this indicates that the present crisis might have provided an opportunity for power shift 
which of course will be opposed by the powerful ones. Harvard professor of economics, Stephen 
Marglin says that GFC has provided an opportunity of Rethinking Economics away from the neo-
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liberal economic ideas. The gaining importance of the developing world in global arena can be clearly 
observed in terms of FDI inflows, FDI outflows and recent GDP growth rates. 
After 1980, the restrictions on FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) over the world were 
dramatically reduced. This was due to  host of factors like globalization policies of developing 
countries, accelerating technological change, emergence of globally integrated production and 
marketing networks, existence of bilateral investment treaties, prescriptions from multilateral 
development banks, and positive evidence from developing countries that have opened their doors to 
FDI. In addition, the drying-up of commercial bank lending due to debt crises brought many 
developing countries to reform their investment policies to attract foreign capital; in this case FDI 
appeared to be an attractive alternative to bank loans as a source of capital inflows. In the process, 
incentives and subsidies were aggressively offered, particularly to multinational companies (MNCs) 
that supported developing countries industrial policies. This led to a rapid expansion of FDI flows 
around the world during the last 30 years. From only $51.5 billion in 1980, FDI outflows reached $1.2 
trillion in 2000 and $1.9 trillion in 2007 (UNCTAD 2008). 
For the sake of empirical analysis the data on world FDI inflows was classified into 
Developed and developing at first instance and continent wise classification has also been considered. 
Two Granger causality test were run for both the classifications. 
The data covers world and region wise FDI inflows for the period 1980-2007. Data are secondary 
which have been collected form IMF and UNCTAD. The econometric technique employed for 
empirical analysis include OLS regressions, ADF test and Granger causality test which are explained 
in detail in the later stage of the article. 
The linear regression models specified for the study are: 
World FDIi= αi+ β1Developed FDIi + β2 Developing FDIi+εi               (1) 
World FDIi= αi+ β1Africa FDIi + β2 Asia FDIi+ β3 America FDIi+ β4 Oceania FDIi+ β5 Europe FDIi+εi                                                                                                                                               
(2) 
While εi represent the “noise” or error term; αi and βi’s represent the slope and coefficients of 
regression. 
Table1. Regression results of model 1 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 917.2115 831.0984 1.103614 0.2812 
Developed  0.989280 0.003109 318.1702 0.0000 
Developing  1.117395 0.051031 21.89620 0.0000 
R2 0.999527    
Adjusted R2 0.999486    
Durbin-Watson  1.947032    
 
 
Table1. clearly specifies that the regression coefficients of model 1 are statistically significant 
indicating that both developed and developing FDI inflows influences the world FDI inflows. 
Both the variables influence the world FDI inflows in almost same proportion. The regression 
equation for model 1 is specified as: 
World = 917.21 + 0.98(Developed) + 1.11(Developing) 
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Table 2.  Regression results of model 2 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 193.9316 2089.640 0.092806 0.9270 
AFRICA 1.546016 0.545122 2.836093 0.0102 
AMERICA 1.097268 0.051086 21.47884 0.0000 
ASIA 0.498881 0.146472 3.405977 0.0028 
OCEANIA 0.845013 0.109970 7.684035 0.0000 
EUROPE 1.026456 0.021023 48.82581 0.0000 
R2 0.998236    
Adjusted R2 0.997796    
Durbin-Watson 2.183856    
 
The regression coefficients of second model are also statistically significant. That is all the 
variables have the capacity to explain variations in world FDI inflows. However, influence of Africa, 
America and Europe is greater when compared to Asia and Oceania. The regression equation for 
model 2 is specified as: 
World = 193.93 + 1.54(Africa) + 1.09(America) + 0.49(Asia) + 0.84(Oceania) + 1.02(Europe) 
The Ordinary Least squares regression analysis establishes the dependence of one variable on others; 
this does not necessarily imply direction of causation between the variables. Kendall and Stuart 
(1961) noted that “a statistical relationship, however strong and however suggestive, can never 
establish causal connection”. Therefore, this study employs another popular method, the Granger 
causality test, used to study the direction of causality between the variables considered. 
Results 
Table 3. Granger causality results for world, developed and developing FDI inflows 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  DEVELOPED2 does not Granger Cause WORLD2 24  0.00489  0.99512 
  WORLD2 does not Granger Cause DEVELOPED2  0.04861  0.95267 
  DEVELOPING2 does not Granger Cause WORLD2 24  0.00737  0.99266 
  WORLD2 does not Granger Cause DEVELOPING2  3.13628  0.06653 
  DEVELOPING2 does not Granger Cause DEVELOPED2 24  0.04132  0.95961 
  DEVELOPED2 does not Granger Cause DEVELOPING2  3.12313  0.06719 
 
Table 3. Granger causality results for world and other regions 
  OCEANIA2 does not Granger Cause WORLD2 24  1.37323  0.27731 
  WORLD2 does not Granger Cause OCEANIA2  1.15779  0.33538 
  AMERICA2 does not Granger Cause WORLD2 24  0.83537  0.44903 
  WORLD2 does not Granger Cause AMERICA2  1.03967  0.37283 
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  ASIA2 does not Granger Cause WORLD2 24  4.51468  0.02488 
  WORLD2 does not Granger Cause ASIA2  10.9264  0.00069 
  EUROPE2 does not Granger Cause WORLD2 24  0.06894  0.93361 
  WORLD2 does not Granger Cause EUROPE2  2.86205  0.08194 
  AFRICA2 does not Granger Cause WORLD2 24  4.54146  0.02443 
  WORLD2 does not Granger Cause AFRICA2  2.65434  0.09626 
  AMERICA2 does not Granger Cause OCEANIA2 24  0.87948  0.43123 
  OCEANIA2 does not Granger Cause AMERICA2  7.22387  0.00464 
  ASIA2 does not Granger Cause OCEANIA2 24  1.95640  0.16882 
  OCEANIA2 does not Granger Cause ASIA2  1.52468  0.24316 
  EUROPE2 does not Granger Cause OCEANIA2 24  2.41369  0.10600 
  OCEANIA2 does not Granger Cause EUROPE2  0.98660  0.39115 
  AFRICA2 does not Granger Cause OCEANIA2 24  6.04980  0.00927 
  OCEANIA2 does not Granger Cause AFRICA2  3.58049  0.04791 
  ASIA2 does not Granger Cause AMERICA2 24  24.0817 0.00233 
  AMERICA2 does not Granger Cause ASIA2  6.55462  0.00684 
  EUROPE2 does not Granger Cause AMERICA2 24  1.56980  0.23391 
  AMERICA2 does not Granger Cause EUROPE2  5.02507  0.01771 
  AFRICA2 does not Granger Cause AMERICA2 24  3.06021  0.07045 
  AMERICA2 does not Granger Cause AFRICA2  8.89318  0.00188 
  EUROPE2 does not Granger Cause ASIA2 24  10.6681  0.00078 
  ASIA2 does not Granger Cause EUROPE2  1.20011  0.32299 
  AFRICA2 does not Granger Cause ASIA2 24  7.16589  0.00480 
  ASIA2 does not Granger Cause AFRICA2  9.51289  0.00137 
  AFRICA2 does not Granger Cause EUROPE2 24  0.96675  0.39826 
  EUROPE2 does not Granger Cause AFRICA2  3.33789  0.05724 
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Chart 1 Granger causality relations in the first model    Chart 2 Granger causality relations in the 
second model     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Causal relationship of world with other regions: 
It is quite obvious from the chart 1 that both world as well as developed countries FDI inflows 
is causing developing countries FDI inflows; however developing countries are causing neither world 
nor developed FDI inflow. On the other side there is no relationship between world and developed 
FDI inflows.  
Chart 2 indicates that world has bidirectional causal relationship with Asia and Africa, 
whereas it has unidrectional causal relationship with Europe with world causing Europe inflows. 
Same has been observed in the Granger Causality tests among world, developed and developing 
regions. 
Africa is one of the regions which is sharing bicausal relationships with world as well as three 
regions namely Asia, America and Oceania. Whereas Europe FDI inflows causes African FDI inflows 
and not vice versa, indicating unidirectional causal relationship. 
In case of Asia the Granger causality test results indicate Asia sharing bicausal relationship 
with world, Africa and America. Like African case Asia has unidirectional relation with Europe. 
America causes Asia, Africa and Europe. Whereas, America is caused by Oceania, Asia and 
Africa. Thus is clear that America has bidirectional causal relationship with Asia, Africa and 
unidirectional with Oceania and Europe. 
The striking aspect observed in the case of Europe is the fact that it shares unidirectional 
relationship and no bicausal relations. Europe causes Asia, Africa and gets caused by America and 
world. 
Oceania has relationship with only Africa and America. With Africa it has two way 
relationships whereas with America it is one way with Oceania causing America.  
Conclusion 
The OLS regression results indicate the significance of developed and developing and also of 
all the regions in explaining world FDI inflows. The Granger causality test results for the different 
regions of the world clearly complement the Granger causality test results for world, developed and 
developing. Where both developed regions and world causes developing region FDI inflows but 
developing does not causes neither world nor developed. 
The most important observation is Asia and Africa indicating similar kind of Granger 
causality test results. Both Africa and Asia share bicausal relationships among themselves and with 
world and America. Europe causes both Asia and Africa this can be because of the application of the 
theories of location as a region, cost-reduction pressures, liberalized investment environment, 
institutional prerequisites for attracting FDI and cultural proximity for these two regions. The only 
difference is the absence of causal relationship between Oceania and Asia and presence of bicasual 
relationship with Oceania and Africa. The similarity of results for African and Asian regions can be 
attributed to the fact that both are potential market for FDI inflows with presence of vast area and 
population. 
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